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TRANSPORTATION AND 
TRANSFORMATION 
THE HUDSON'S BAY COMPANY, 1857 .. 1885 
A. A. DEN OTTER 
Lansportation was a prime consideration in 
the business policies of the Hudson's Bay Com-
pany from its inception. Although the company 
legally enjoyed the position of monopoly by 
virtue of the Royal Charter of 1670, which 
granted to the Hudson's Bay Company the 
Canadian territory called Rupert's Land, this 
privilege had to be defended from commercial 
intruders. From the earliest days the company 
developed its own transportation network in 
order to maintain a competitive edge over its 
opponents. During its first century, when 
business ventured hardly beyond the shores of 
the Hudson Bay, the company perfected its 
transatlantic shipping. Later, when competitors 
from Montreal moved into the western interior, 
the Hudson's Bay Company countered by open-
ing several inland rivers, developing a unique 
wooden craft, the Y orkboat, and constructing 
rollered passage ways around several rapids. The 
A. A. den Otter is associate professor of history 
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efficiency of its transportation system enabled 
the company to defeat all challengers, includ-
ing the Montreal traders, who were absorbed in 
1821. Starving the competition by slashing 
prices, trading liquor, and deploying its best 
servants to critical areas were other tactics the 
company employed to preserve its fur empire. 1 
The principal means by which the Hudson's 
Bay Company defended its trade monopoly, 
nevertheless, was to maintain an efficient trans-
portation system into Rupert's Land. 
By the 1850s the company's policy of con-
trolling access to its fur preserve faced an 
entirely new and potentially fatal challenge. 
Settlement, with technology based on an ex-
panding agricultural-industrial economy, was 
rapidly approaching the undeveloped plains. 
The economic activities of this encroaching 
civilization foretold death for the fur trade. 
Several fur empires in other parts of North 
America had already yielded to the relentless 
advance of settlement; company officials knew 
that theirs would also eventually succumb. As 
early as 1849 Peter Skene Ogden, the chief 
factor in Oregon, wrote George Simpson, the 
resident governor of the Hudson's Bay Com-
pany, "You are I presume fully aware that the 
fur trade and civilization can never blend 
172 GREAT PLAINS QUARTERLY, SUMMER 1983 
together and experience teaches us that the 
former invariably gives way to the latter.,,2 
Understanding that the fall of the fertile 
portion of Rupert's Land to agricultural settle-
ment was inevitable, the Hudson's Bay Com-
pany developed a strategy to retain its hold 
over the fur trade wherever possible and to 
dominate the commercial potential of the new 
economic order.3 Accessibility was the key to 
the survival plan; realizing that transportation 
was the vanguard of the new civilization, the 
company once again decided to control this 
technology within its domain and to develop 
it to the company's own advantage. 
The most obvious legal threat to the com-
pany's charter came from the province of 
Canada. This British colony could claim histor-
ical, imperial, and juridical ties with Rupert's 
Land. During the 1850s, however, the provin-
cial government did not press claims to the 
territories. The editor of the Toronto Globe, 
George Brown, tried to rally his readers to the 
cause of western annexation-for years his 
strident editorials praised the Northwest as a 
panacea for the stagnating economy of Upper 
Canada-but his proposal remained a minor 
issue even in his own Clear Grit party and was 
dismissed as unimportant by the Montreal 
press.4 In 1857 a legislative committee, estab-
lished to investigate the worrisome emigration 
of young Canadians to the United States, com-
pletely ignored the prairies as a haven for pro-
spective farmers and urged instead that they be 
retained in Canada by means of a vigorous 
industrialization policy. 5 That same year 
Canada's position at the British parliamentary 
inquiry into the Hudson's Bay Company license 
was timid and noncommittal. Canada simply 
could not afford to buyout the company's 
charter and trading rights nor could it finance 
the administration of such a vast domain. 6 
Overshadowing these political considerations 
was a formidable geographical barrier. Eight 
hundred miles of uninhabitable swamps, forests, 
and hills separated Canada from the fertile 
prairies. Although several Canadian enthusiasts 
proposed grandiose schemes to bridge the 
Canadian Shield, none were able to gather 
enough support to construct an efficient, pro-
fitable system of transportation. Of all the 
projects, only the North West Transportation, 
Navigation, and Railway Company was put into 
operation. In summer 1858 the firm inaugu-
rated an agonizingly slow mail and transport 
link between Canada and the prairies. But the 
next year, when the Hudson's Bay Company 
withdrew its cooperation, the attempt col-
lapsed. 7 The eastern approach to the company's 
empire was safe for the time being. 
On the southern flank, however, the situa-
tion was radically different. In the United 
States, entrepreneurs had backed the new 
steampower technology with enough capital 
to fuel a transportation revolution. Throughout 
the 1850s innovative promoters utilized steam-
boats and railways to open the interior of the 
continent. Early in the decade, after American 
railways reached the Mississippi River, mer-
chants in Saint Paul, Minnesota, began to com-
bine river and rail to transport their merchan-
dise. In this way they doubled the length of the 
shipping season and, by using carts north of 
the city, penetrated deep into the territory 
monopolized by the Hudson's Bay Company. 
By 1854 they were at the gates of the rich 
Athabasca district. 8 
The company responded by improving the 
river route from York Factory on the Hudson 
Bay, but by 1857 the northern route was too 
slow and the required labor too expensive to 
compete with the Saint Paul approach. More-
over, it could not manage the rapidly increasing 
traffic load. Consequently, in 1858, Governor 
George Simpson authorized a trial shipment of 
soap and sugar via Saint Paul. The experiment 
was successful and saved the company consider-
able time and money.9 
The company's move spurred the Saint Paul 
merchants to greater efforts. In 1859 the newly 
formed Saint Paul chamber of commerce of-
fered one thousand dollars to the first captain 
to steam a vessel down the Red River of the 
North to Fort Garry. Captain Anson Northup 
took up the challenge: he carted a dismantled 
stern-wheeler from the Mississippi to the 
Red River, reassembled it inside a new hull, 
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christened the vessel the Anson Northup, and 
on 10 June 1859, reached Fort Garry.10 The 
settlement bells and cannons that welcomed the 
Anson Northup signalled a serious breach in the 
transportation monopoly of the Hudson's Bay 
Company. 
The company responded to the threat by 
buying Northup's steamer. Possession of his 
vessel, however, did not mean complete control 
over the Red River, because American law 
prohibited foreign companies from owning 
property in the United States. To circumvent 
this law, the company worked out a secret 
partnership with the Saint Paul firm of R. C. 
and J. C. Burbank. The Minnesota company 
agreed to carry Hudson's Bay Company goods 
overland with carts from Saint Paul to George-
town on the Red River, and with two steamers 
(the Anson Northup, refurbished and renamed 
the Pioneer, and the International) to Fort 
Garry. The Burbanks retained the right to carry 
free-trade goods, but at substantially higher 
prices. l1 Governor Simpson reported on what 
appeared to be a satisfactory arrangement: 
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FIG. 1. The Anson Northup, first steamer on the Red River, from an engraving in The Win-
nipeg Country, 1859. Manitoba Archives. 
Our overland transport is likely to work 
quite a revolution in the business & be at-
tended with economy & other advantages-
By getting in abundant supplies, with dis-
patch & at a reduced rate we are able to 
drive the free traders & Americans out of the 
field, & to turn our position to account, by 
effecting large sales at remunerative rates. 
With proper energy in our arrangements, I 
feel satisfied we can hold the command of 
the trade against all the world. 12 
Despite the obvious advantages of the Min-
nesota route, the arrangements with the Bur-
banks were not satisfactory. The American 
partners were primarily interested in general 
trade and therefore actively promoted the 
settlement of the plains. This fundamental 
conflict of interests led to numerous squabbles 
and disagreements; thus, when the Sioux up-
risings blocked the Minnesota route in 1863, 
the companies broke their pact.13 A subse-
quent contract with another American firm 
also failed and so the company undertook its 
own freighting operations under the name of its 
agent, Norman W. Kittson. Low waters allowed 
only intermittent use of the steamers, but even 
when the boats were supplemented with Red 
River carts, the company realized significant 
savings. By the end of the decade, the Minne-
sota route was an important addition to the 
Hudson Bay ports and the company had re-
tained control over a vital access to its em-
pire.14 
Soon after the company's officers had 
neutralized the encroachment of Saint Paul 
business interests, they became involved in an 
attempt by several British financiers to open 
communications with the Northwest and to 
develop its fertile soil. Edward Watkin, the 
president of Canada's ailing Grand Trunk 
Railway, initiated the move. An idealistic 
visionary, Watkin proposed to save his company 
from collapse by incorporating the existing 
lines of the Grand Trunk into a transcontinen-
tal railway through British North America. To 
facilitate the plan, he also suggested the unifica-
tion of British North America, the annexation 
of the Northwest, and the settlement of the prai-
ries.1S As the first step Watkin organized the At-
lantic and Pacific Postal and Telegraph Company 
to build a telegraph line across the continent. He 
petitioned the colonial office for a subsidy and 
the Hudson's Bay Company for a vaguely defined 
but broad right-of-way. The government em-
phatically refused his request but the company 
tentatively agreed to a very narrow thoroughfare. 
To Watkin's surprise, company officials hinted 
that he should buy up all the company's shares 
and thus control its policies directly.1 6 
Watkin leaped at the opportunity and by the 
summer of 1863 had worked out an arrange-
ment to buy the Hudson's Bay Company. To 
finance the purchase, he turned to the Interna-
tional Financial Society, an association formed 
by London bankers to make investments across 
the globe.17 One of the society'S first purchases 
was a majority of the shares of the Hudson's 
Bay Company. Thus, on 15 June 1863, this influ-
ential society named a new board of governors 
for the old, closed company and for the first 
time put its stock on the open market. Although 
the deal was primarily a lucrative refinancing 
operation, a society brochure spoke in glowing 
terms of the settlement potential of the North-
west while scarcely mentioning the enormous 
cost of establishing communications or civil 
government in the territories. 18 The brochure 
marked the dramatic change in a fundamental 
policy of the Hudson's Bay Company: instead of 
blocking the approach of settlement, the com-
pany, under its new management, intended to 
establish modern communications in its territo-
ries and to control the development of resources. 
Colonizing the southwestern portion of 
Rupert's Land was a venture beset by complex 
political considerations and costly long-term 
investments, and Watkin was moving too quick-
ly for the cautious London bankers. Already in 
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July 1863 he was in Canada negotiating a deal 
whereby the Montreal Telegraph Company 
would undertake the construction of a tele-
graph line from Halifax to Sault Ste. Marie if the 
Hudson's Bay Company would complete a line 
from Fort Langley to Pembina by way of Fort 
Garry. Watkin proposed that either the Canadian 
government subsidize the Fort Garry and Sault 
Ste. Marie section or his company would utilize 
existing American telegraph lines south of the 
Great Lakes. Confident of success, Watkin au-
thorized D. S. Wood of the Montreal Telegraph 
Company to construct the line from Fort Garry 
to Jasper House under a Hudson's Bay Company 
contract. Although all these proposals awaited 
the approval of the governing committee, Watkin 
placed a provisional order for copper wire.19 
Watkin's enthusiasm temporarily overwhelmed 
the committee, and although angry about his 
unauthorized actions, it approved his order for 
nearly two hundred tons of copper wire to be 
delivered to several points in the Northwest.20 
The committee's move was especially precipi-
tous, because the Canadian government had just 
refused to make any financial commitments for 
western communications. More ominously, 
Canada was once again challenging the validity 
of the company's charter; soon the telegraph 
project was lost in the prolonged and complex 
debate about the future of Rupert's Land. 
The negotiations that led to the termina-
tion of the Hudson's Bay Company's charter 
consumed more than a decade. All parties in-
volved agreed that Canada should control at 
least the fertile portion of Rupert's Land, but 
they could not concur on the terms of the 
transfer. Company officials wanted as large an 
indemnity for the charter as they could get, 
while Canadian politicians refused to payout 
large sums of money for the territories or 
assume the enormous cost of administering and 
settling the region without a substantial imperial 
subsidy. The British negotiators, hamstrung by 
the chaotic politics of the period, knew that 
Parliament would not approve expenditures for 
the economic benefit of a colony nor would it 
defend the rights of an anachronistic fur mo-
nopoly. The result was a war of words, couched 
in diplomacy and fought with memoranda. 
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Time and circumstance were on the side 
of the colonial office. The rapid influx of 
settlers into Minnesota and the Dakotas threat-
ened to spill over into Canada. Indeed, several 
influential Americans were calling for the 
annexation of Rupert's Land to the United 
States. In Ontario, meanwhile, political pressure 
was mounting for the Canadian government to 
act quickly to reserve the Northwest for Cana-
dians. The Hudson's Bay Company realized that 
it had lost administrative control over the terri-
tories and would eventually lose economic 
dominance over at least the fertile portion. The 
colonial office, using these conditions to its 
advantage, gradually whittled down the ex-
treme positions of both sides and in March 
1869 imposed a settlement. In exchange for 
ceding Rupert's Land to Canada, the com-
pany woula retain title to some land surround-
ing its posts and to one-twentieth of the land in 
the fertile belt, receiving a compensation of 
three hundred thousand pounds. The Canadian 
government quickly accepted the settlement, 
but the Hudson's Bay Company acquiesced 
only after unsuccessfully seeking some major 
. . h 21 Improvements In t e terms. 
The company's surrender of the charter 
meant the defeat of the colonizers among its 
shareholders. For the past five years, Edward 
Watkin and his supporters had tried to trans-
form a fur-trade business into a huge coloniza-
tion company.22 They failed because, as Sir 
Stafford Northcote, the governor, explained, 
private corporations no longer possessed the 
moral authority to maintain law and govern-
ment in a populated region. Without properly 
constituted civil administration and law courts, 
the company dared not even sell land, especial-
lyon credit. Moreover, the governor pointed 
out, the Hudson's Bay Company did not com-
mand the resources to finance the infrastruc-
ture-government, telegraphs, railways, and 
warehouses-necessary to support coloniza-
tion. 23 The settlement of 1869 decided aban-
donment of colonization. 
The loss of the charter significantly altered 
the position of the Hudson's Bay Company. 
Although the charter had never prevented the 
incursion of free traders, its abrogation opened 
the territories to all business interests as well as 
settlers. Throughout the negotiations, senior 
company officials had debated among them-
selves "the future position of the company 
with reference not only to its business as a fur 
trade company but with reference to its posi-
tion as a great commercial company supplying 
this settlement which is likely to be formed 
with a view to dealing with the land that is left 
to it, and with a view to its assisting in opening 
up that country.,,24 By 1871 the Hudson's 
Bay Company had decided not to abandon the 
fur trade but to modernize its management. 
The company also determined to capture a 
large share of the general trade that would be 
created by the settlement of the prairies. But, 
as Governor Northcote cautioned the com-
pany's shareholders, profits would dwindle 
unless the company offset the shrewd business 
practices of its competitors. The only advan-
tage the company had, according to Northcote, 
was its expertise in wilderness transportation. 
It was time, he declared, to streamline all parts 
of the company's transportation system in 
order to preserve its dominant place in the com-
merce of the Northwest. 25 
Northcote's call for the modernization of 
the company's transportation system carried a 
note of urgency. Several railways were already 
approaching its business empire. In 1871 the 
Northern Pacific reached the Red River from its 
terminal at Duluth; the same year, the St. Paul 
and Pacific arrived at the river from Saint Paul. 
The St. Paul and Pacific planned to push north-
ward as far as the international border at 
Pembina and asked the Hudson's Bay Company 
to complete the line to Fort Garry.26 The com-
pany's chief commissioner, Donald Smith, 
petitioned the Canadian government for a 
charter to construct a railway from Pembina to 
Fort Garry and thence to Fort William on Lake 
Superior. Parliament never considered the 
charter, probably because the administration 
was then planning the Canadian transconti-
nental railway. 27 Financial difficulties further 
hampered the St. Paul and Pacific's plans, and 
in 1873 the railroad went into receivership 
along with the Northern Pacific. Despite their 
financial problems, the two railways provided 
western businesses with fast and efficient 
transportation between the head of navigation 
of the Red River and all major eastern Ameri-
can and Canadian cities. 
Meanwhile, steamboat transportation on 
the Red River also improved. In 1871 James J. 
Hill, an ambitious partner of the Saint Paul firm 
of Hill, Griggs and Company, launched the 
Selkirk on the river. After the Hudson's Bay 
Company refused to pay his high rates, Hill 
declared that American law permitted only 
domestic ships to ply the rivers of the United 
States. The British-owned Hudson's Bay Com-
pany successfully thwarted Hill by transferring 
the ownership of the International to its 
agent, Norman Kittson, an American citizen. 
Competition, however, served only to reduce 
rates and profits; therefore, in 1872 the two 
rivals founded the Red River Transportation 
Company, which set preferential tariffs for the 
Hudson's Bay Company and ruled the river 
virtually unchallenged until 1878. The consoli-
dation of'the two competitors proved to be an 
extremely lucrative transportation monopoly. 
In 1878, for example, the Red River Transpor-
tation Company paid a dividend of 80 percent 
to all its shareholders, including the Hudson's 
Bay Company.28 
The introduction of reliable train and 
steamship service to Fort Garry forced the 
Hudson's Bay Company to undertake a compre-
hensive renovation of its transport network. As 
long as the company had held imperial sway 
over the unsettled expanse of Rupert's Land, it 
could safely neglect to revamp its interior 
transportation system. But with the moderni-
zation of the Red River route, the company 
could no longer afford to rely on old carrying 
methods. The complex Yorkboat shuttle from 
the fur-trading posts York Factory or Moose 
Factory on the Hudson Bay, or from Fort 
Garry via Norway House to the outlying plains 
and forests of the Northwest, was too slow and 
expensive. At best, four years were required to 
realize a return on capital invested in trade 
goods. In 1869 and again in 1870, valuable furs 
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had been left to winter in the country, accumu-
lating interest charges and eroding profits. 
Moreover, this fragile system of moving goods 
depended upon Indians and metis, who were 
expensive to pay and feed and difficult to re-
cruit for the backbreaking work.29 
To meet the challenge of improved rail and 
river transportation and increased competition, 
the Hudson's Bay Company attempted to re-
duce operating costs by using its own fleet of 
steamships on Lake Winnipeg and the Saskat-
chewan River. In May 1872 it launched the 
Chief Commissioner, but the boat was ill suited 
for the rough waters of Lake Winnipeg and 
was retired only three years later. The next year 
an unnamed boat foundered on the first rapids 
it encountered on the Saskatchewan River. 30 
Undeterred by these misfortunes, the company 
commissioned the Colville to replace the Chief 
Commissioner on Lake Winnipeg and built the 
Northcote to ply the Saskatchewan. The North-
cote, a Mississippi River type of stern-wheeler, 
reached Carlton House late in 1874.31 The 
following summer, even though the company 
still needed to deploy the traditional flotilla 
of Y orkboats for the bulk of its trade goods 
and supplies, the steamers demonstrated their 
cost efficiency and the company nearly re-
covered its investment.32 
As the general economic depression of the 
1870s drove down fur prices, Hudson's Bay 
Company officials were more determined than 
ever to cut their transport expenses. The firm 
built a 3Yz-mile tramway around the Grand 
Rapids as an efficient traI)sshipping point be-
tween Lake Winnipeg and the Saskatchewan 
River. The company also planned to place 
steamers on the Clearwater and Athabasca 
rivers in its far northern domain and worked to 
improve several portages and overland routes.33 
In 1876 the company purchased the Lily from 
a Clyde shipyard and carried it in sections to 
the Northwest. The Lily, which was equipped 
with a steel hull as a protection against rocks, 
had a deeper draft than intended. Ironically, 
it often grounded on the shallow river bottom 
and in 1883 hit a rock near Medicine Hat 
and sank.34 The Northcote, although better 
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designed, also experienced difficulties navigat-
ing the shallow Saskatchewan. By the end of 
the decade, modern steamship technology had 
not yet conquered the capricious northern 
rivers. 
It was apparent that the Saskatchewan 
River's channel required extensive modifica-
tions before it could serve as an efficient water-
way for the company's steamboats. The task 
fell to C. J. Brydges, who in 1879 was appointed 
the company's land commissioner as part of a 
general shake-up of the senior administration.35 
Brydges lobbied the Canadian government to 
remove the most troublesome boulders from 
various rapids and to build warping piers and 
wingdams at several small waterfalls on the 
Saskatchewan. Despite his close friendship with 
such leading politicians as Prime Minister John 
A. Macdonald, Brydges had little success. All 
he gained was the reimbursement of the twenty-
five thousand dollars his company had spent in 
1882 and 1883 on a haphazard boulder removal 
program. The federal government subsequently 
spent another thirty-five thousand dollars on 
the river. 36 Compared to the massive subsidies 
to railroads, the expenditures on navigational 
improvements were minuscule and clearly be-
trayed the government's priorities. 
To back his lobbying efforts, Brydges com-
mitted the Hudson's Bay Company to a sub-
stantial expansion in its steamboat operations. 
If the government would agree to underwrite 
the river improvements, then Brydges promised 
not only to open the company's ships to public 
traffic but to increase the size of the fleet. 37 
Brydges's pledge marked a significant change in 
company policy because the boats had been 
built primarily for the company's own benefit, 
to cripple the opposition. Brydges, however, 
saw the issue from a different perspective. He 
explained his view to the governor's committee. 
"Unless the company is prepared to make its 
boats available for public traffic and especially 
in regards for the Indian department, ... there 
will undoubtedly be an opposition line of boats 
put upon the river, which will have the effect of 
opening up the whole of the northern country 
for supplies for fur trading purposes in direct 
OpposltlOn to the Hudson's Bay Company.,,38 
The argument was not lost on the board. In-
deed, Chief Commissioner James A. Grahame, 
the executive largely responsible for steamboat 
policy, had on occasion permitted the fleet to 
carry public goods. But, because present vessels 
could not handle even all of the Hudson's Bay 
Company's requirements, he realized that 
creating a general steam transport system would 
require expensive investments in new ships. 
That was a task few committee members 
wanted to take on, particularly at a time when 
a prolonged economic depression had seriously 
eroded fur prices. The committee emphatical-
ly warned Brydges not to undertake major 
investments to expand the fleet. 39 
Brydges's fears of competing steamboats 
were well founded-and a direct result of the 
continuing expansion of the railroads in the 
1870s. In 1877 Donald A. Smith and James J. 
Hill, with the cooperation of George Stephen, 
the president of the Bank of Montreal, and 
John S. Kennedy, a prominent New York 
l:anker, had gained control of the assets of the 
bankrupt St. Paul and Pacific Railroad. The 
following year they completed the road to 
Winnipeg (formerly Fort Garry) and renamed it 
the St. Paul, Minneapolis, and Manitoba Rail-
road.40 The establishment of a rail link between 
Winnipeg and Saint Paul rendered the Red 
River steamboat service obsolete. Thus, in 1878 
the Red River Transportation Company sold 
the bulk of its fleet to the Winnipeg and West-
ern Transportation Company, formed by a 
group of Montreal, Winnipeg, and Saint Paul 
businessmen to operate the ships on the Assini-
boine River. Late in 1879, however, Hill, Smith, 
and Stephen became the principal members 
of the Canadian Pacific Railway Syndicate, 
founded to build Canada's transcontinental 
railway. When the Canadian Pacific decided to 
build its mainline through the southern portion 
of the prairies, parallel to the Assiniboine, the 
Winnipeg and Western Transportation Company 
planned to transfer its ships to the Saskatche-
wan River.41 Meanwhile, a second firm, called 
the North West Navigation Company, formed 
in 1880 by Montreal, Winnipeg, and Scottish 
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FIG. 2. The Hudson's Bay Company's steamer North West, moored at Edmonton, 1896. 
E. Brown Collection, Provincial Archives of Alberta. 
financiers, also proposed to place several steam-
ers on the river, as well as on Lake Winnipeg.42 
To meet the threat of competition, Grahame 
and Brydges sold the Hudson's Bay Company 
fleet to the two newcomers, used the revenue 
from the sale to buy a majority interest in both 
companies, and early in 1881 concluded a 
freighting agreement to their mutual advantage. 
The collusion limited the operations of the 
Winnipeg and Western Transportation Company 
to the Saskatchewan River and those of the 
North West Navigation Company to Lake Win-
nipeg. Both firms agreed to grant the Hudson's 
Bay Company a 10 percent rebate on their 
freight rates. 43 Therefore, with no heavy capi-
tal expenditures for ship construction, Grahame 
and Brydges created a transportation monopoly 
on both Lake Winnipeg and the Saskatchewan 
River, won a preferential position for the Hud-
son's Bay Company, maintained general control 
over a fleet of five river and three lake steamers, 
and delegated daily management responsibilities 
to experienced personnel. 
The monopoly was not as profitable as the 
collaborators had envisioned. Without extensive 
work on the falls and rapids of the Saskatche-
wan River, which Brydges had so strenuously 
promoted earlier, navigation was not reliable. 
Moreover, because water levels on the river 
remained low for the next few years, the 
Winnipeg and Western Transportation Company 
consistently failed to deliver vital supplies to 
the small communities along the Saskatchewan 
River. These shortfalls caused hardships among 
the settlers and destroyed the confidence of 
retailers.44 Increasingly, western merchants 
turned to the Canadian Pacific Railway, which 
was then being laid across the prairies. Even the 
Hudson's Bay Company deserted the steam-
boats : in 1884 and 1885 the company shipped 
most of its Edmonton and some of its Mac-
kenzie and Athabasca outfits with the Pacific 
railway via Calgary. 45 Although the overland 
route was more costly, it was much faster and 
finally enabled the company to distribute its 
trade goods within a single season. In a highly 
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FIG. 3. The Canadian Pacific Railway's Countess of Dufferin arrives by steamer in Winnipeg, 
1877. Manitoba Archives. 
competitive business based on luxury goods and 
fluctuating prices, speed and reliability were 
absolute requirements for success. The river 
steamers delivered neither, and over the years 
they were phased out of existence, replaced 
by the more efficient railroads. 
Although the steamboat program repre-
sented a last-ditch effort to control access to 
the fur domain, the company finally surrend-
ered its transportation monopoly to the con-
troller of a more modern technology. Railway 
technology was beyond the financial resources 
of the Hudson's Bay Company. The company 
could not afford to purchase a controlling 
interest in such large enterprises as the St. Paul 
and Pacific and the Canadian Pacific railways, 
nor could it generate the traffic to warrant 
such massive investments. Railways, unlike 
steamboats, could not be used to shut competi-
tors out of its fur domain. In fact, railways 
depended on expanding commerce and grow-
ing settlement, the very antithesis of the best 
conditions for the fur trade. For the first time, 
the Hudson's Bay Company lost control over 
the transportation of its trade goods, one of the 
most vital aspects of its operations. 
The construction of the Canadian Pacific 
Railway completed the transformation of the 
Hudson's Bay Company from a privileged 
monopoly to a diversified business struggling 
to be competitive. The London committee 
abolished the post of chief commissioner and 
created a subcommittee of two Canadian resi-
dents to oversee the entire Canadian operations. 
The committee also appointed Joseph Wrigley 
to the new chief executive post of trade com-
missioner. 46 Wrigley was keenly aware of how 
drastically the Canadian Pacific had altered the 
business environment in western Canada, and 
he believed that the change should be harnessed 
for the benefit of the Hudson's Bay Company. 
"I would suggest," he wrote, "that the com-
pany should endeavour to adopt its business to 
altered circumstances and make vigorous effort 
not only to hold its own, but to advance and 
try to increase in the north the collection of 
Furs, and in the south general business.,,47 
Wrigley's northern policy emphasized cost 
reductions and modern business techniques, 
particularly necessary because by 1885 fur 
prices had fallen to all-time lows. Since demand 
was not likely to grow, but competition would, 
productivity had to be increased. The railway 
mad~ Wrigley's task easier because he could 
instruct the nearer districts to order merchan-
dise twice a year instead of two years in ad-
vance as before. Careful inventory control 
reduced capital investments, prevented the 
buildup of unpopular stock, and broadened the 
selection of goods. Wrigley also instructed all 
posts and stores to adopt modern accounting 
procedures and instituted a formal inspectorate 
to ensure efficient operations.48 
The Hudson's Bay Company's southern 
policy was more complex and aggressive. For 
example, even as the Canadian Pacific Railway 
advanced across the plains, the company ex-
panded its bids on government supply contracts 
to include the southwestern corner of the 
Canadian prairies. Traditionally, two Fort Ben-
ton firms, I. G. Baker and Company and T. C. 
Power and Brother, had dominated the region. 
The Hudson's Bay Company had tolerated the 
invasion of its commercial territory because its 
supply lines could not equal the more efficient 
Missouri River system. 49 By 1879 the situation 
began to change. The Hudson's Bay Company's 
fleet on the Saskatchewan River could tender 
for Indian department contracts recently swol-
len by the privation among prairie Indians. The 
company changed its policy and from 1880 on 
annually captured most of the government's 
business along the Saskatchewan. The south-
western area was left to the Fort Benton mer-
chants because the company's overland system 
still could not match their transport economy. 50 
The arrival of the Canadian Pacific changed 
even that approach. With freight expenses 
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dramatically reduced, the Hudson's Bay Com-
pany could tender for all government contracts 
in the Northwest. 51 
The ability to bid on all prairie contracts was 
a mixed blessing. Since rail transportation 
opened the hinterland to all companies, the 
government began to parcel out its contracts 
to various firms; in return, the increased compe-
tition lowered prices and profits. To meet the 
new situation, the two Fort Benton firms 
divided their American and Canadian govern-
ment business between themselves, excluded 
all opponents from their transport system, and 
even equalized profits. 52 I. G. Baker, who had 
taken the Canadian portion, approached the 
Hudson's Bay Company for a similar division 
of territory, but the latter company refused. 53 
Although the Hudson's Bay Company still 
viewed government contracts as "a delusion and 
snare" because they diverted too much capital 
and time from the regular trade, it nevertheless 
determined to eliminate the American firm 
from its traditional domain. 54 The company 
enjoyed the significant advantages of size, 
British connections, and all-Canadian transport, 
and eventually squeezed I. G. Baker out of the 
government supply business. 
The Hudson's Bay Company also clashed 
with the I. G. Baker firm in the retail trade. In 
addition to its large department store in Winni-
peg, the company operated smaller concerns at 
Portage la Prairie and other Manitoba centers. 
As the Canadian Pacific Railway moved west-
ward, so did the company. In 1884, for exam-
ple, the company built a warehouse and retail 
store on several town lots purchased in Calgary. 
It also constructed a small outlet at Battle River 
Crossing north of Calgary specifically to com-
pete with I. G. Baker. In fact, the company 
intended to drive the American firm south of 
the Canadian Pacific mainline. That objective 
was not lost on the Fort Benton merchants. 
I. G. Baker and Company offered to sell its 
Calgary store at a 40 percent discount on its 
stock and promised not to open another estab-
lishment in Calgary or points north. The 
Hudson's Bay Company accepted the offer with 
only minor amendments. 55 The Calgary deal 
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became the prelude to the eventual takeover of 
all of I. G. Baker's Canadian operations. 
One of the reasons the Hudson's Bay Com-
pany was able to beat the American competi-
tion was the special arrangement made with the 
Canadian Pacific Railway. The company had 
been able to wrest extra concessions from the 
railroad because of the size of its shipments and 
the long distances involved. In addition, Donald 
Smith, the company's largest shareholder, was 
also a Canadian Pacific director. Smith was 
only one of the policy makers in the railway 
corporation, however, and his railway ties 
would preclude the company from using Amer-
ican rail lines to reach the Canadian Northwest. 
Consequently, mutual interest suggested that 
the company ship by steamer to Montreal, use 
the Canadian Pacific to western Canadian 
stations, and in return receive a modest rebate. 
In June 1885 the Canadian Pacific secretly 
granted the Hudson's Bay Company a 12Yz 
percent rebate on all freight east of Winnipeg. 
The Hudson's Bay Company had wanted to 
include flour exports, but the railroad refused, 
ostensibly because the rate on flour was already 
low, but probably because it did not want to 
give the company a special advantage on such 
an important export item. 56 Nevertheless, the 
agreement once again made Montreal the gate-
way to the Northwest. 
The failure to secure a freight rate conces-
sion on flour shipments was a disappointment 
to company officials. Although milling was 
only an incidental part of the company's total 
business, Trade Commissioner Wrigley planned 
to test the Montreal and London markets in 
the hope that flour sales would eventually re-
place the lost fur-trade revenues. Unfortunately, 
the company's mills at Fort Garry and West 
Lynne were badly outdated. Wrigley lamented 
the fact that even the new mill at Prince Albert 
was being built "on the old and nearly obsolete 
[stone 1 principle" and feared that if anyone 
erected a modern roller mill nearby, the com-
pany's plant would soon be out of business. 
Despite the company's retrenchment program, 
Wrigley strongly recommended that the board 
install roller machinery at Prince Albert and 
spend an additional twelve thousand dollars 
to convert the Fort Garry mill. Although the 
committee was initially reluctant, it finally 
agreed that flour milling was potentially a big 
money-maker and approved the modernization 
of the two mills. 5 7 
Flour milling was not the only avenue for 
profit that the Canadian Pacific opened to the 
Hudson's Bay Company. The start of prairie 
construction sparked a real estate boom that 
dramatically boosted the company's land sales. 
Even though the land rush eventually collapsed, 
sales continued, although at a slower pace. The 
westward progress of the railway steadily in-
creased land values and enhanced company 
profits. The governing committee decided to 
return the bonus revenues directly to share-
holders by lowering the nominal value of com-
pany shares and by paying out the reduction in 
cash. In this manner, the company wrote down 
the value of its shares from twenty to thirteen 
pounds and disbursed the seven hundred thou-
sand pounds of profit its land account had 
earned in the fifteen years after the surrender 
of its charter. 58 Land sales promised to offset 
the loss of the fur monopoly for the Hudson's 
Bay Company after the opening of the North-
west by the Canadian Pacific. 
The loss of the fur and transportation 
monopoly, therefore, had nat adversely af-
fected the balance sheet of the Hudson's Bay 
Company. Rather, it was the general economic 
depression of the 1870s and 1880s that caused 
the company's lean years. Dwindling profits 
coincided with a transformation in business 
policies occasioned by a drastically changed 
environment. Traditionally, the Hudson's Bay 
Company had operated in splendid isolation, 
countering challengers with a formal policy of 
shrewd trading techniques on the fringes of its 
fur empire and an implicit strategy of managing 
transportation within this domain. The arrival 
of fast and efficient means of transport made 
its territory even more vulnerable to inter-
lopers; consequently, restraint of access became 
increasingly important. As long as the Hudson's 
Bay Company was able to control the ap-
proaches to its business realm, it could to some 
extent manage its rate of development and curb 
free trade. By making its own transportation 
systems as efficient as possible, the company 
could undercut opponents and prevent the rise 
of competing systems. This had been the ration-
ale for the company's Minnesota route, the 
involvement with the Atlantic and Pacific 
Postal and Telegraph Company, and the con-
struction of the Saskatchewan River steam-
boats. By 1880, with the advent of western 
Canadian railways, the company's transporta-
tion monopoly disintegrated. The Hudson's 
Bay Company could not afford the enormous 
investment that railroad technology required; 
therefore, the company could no longer trans-
port its own trade goods and supplies. Yet, 
even as the Canadian Pacific ended the fur-trade 
era on the prairies and contiguous forest, the 
railroad also ushered in a new age for the Hud-
son's Bay Company. Access to the far northern 
fur forest was cheapened and the company 
became more competitive on the world market. 
In the south the railway opened new oppor-
tunities in land sales, retailing, government 
supply contracts, and flour milling. Backed by 
a centuries-old business, newly appointed man-
agers readily adjusted the company to the new 
order. 
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